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1. Introduction 
 
Exchange rate economics has gone through different stages. The early theoretical 
models were developed mainly in the 1970s (monetary model, Dornbusch model, 
portfolio balance model, and others). These ‘first generation’ models led to testable 
propositions in which the changes in the exchange rate are linearly related to news in 
the fundamentals (money stocks, prices, output, current accounts, etc.). After 
intensive empirical testing it is fair to conclude that the first generation models were 
soundly rejected by the data, at least for the exchange rates of countries 
experiencing relatively low levels of inflation. Three serious anomalies of the first 
generation models were detected.  
First, in their celebrated empirical studies Meese and Rogoff (1983), (1988) found that 
the random walk forecast typically outperforms a forecast based on the first 
generation models even when these modes have access to perfectly anticipated 
future fundamentals1. Although occasionally some researchers have claimed that 
their model could beat the random walk, the scientific consensus today is that the 
Meese and Rogoff results still stand. An important implication of this finding is that the 
coefficients of the fundamentals in the exchange rate equations are subject to 
frequent structural changes, making these equations unfit for predictive purposes. The 
existence of frequent structural shifts in the linear exchange rate equations has been 
well documented (see e.g. Frydman and Goldberg (2001)). 
A second anomaly detected in the empirical literature is the following. Since the start 
of the floating exchange rate regime the variability of the exchange rates (both 
nominal and real) has increased dramatically. At the same time there is no evidence 
to be found that the variability of the fundamentals identified by the theoretical 
models has increased compared to the fixed exchange rate period (see Baxter and 
Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995)). This is in contradiction with the first 
generation models, which imply that the variability of the exchange rate can only 
increase when the variability of the underlying fundamental variables increases. This 
result has led to the view that the variability of the exchange rates is largely 
disconnected from the variability of the underlying fundamentals. In their recent 
                                                 
1 There is some evidence that when forecasting over a longer horizon, say, more than one year, 
fundamentals based models sometimes outperform the random walk. It should be borne in mind though, 
that these fundamentalist forecasts (based on perfect foresight of future fundamentals) use an information 
set that is much larger than the information set needed to make random walk forecasts. This also implies 
that the long term forecasts based on the economic models use more information than the short-term 
forecasts. It is therefore not really surprising that they perform better. Independent evidence on PPP also 
suggests that if there is a long-term mechanism driving the exchange rate, it is indeed a very long one. In 
this large literature on PPP it is found that it takes 3 to 4 years for half of the adjustment towards PPP to be 
realised after a shock. See Rogoff (1996). 
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paper Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) have identified this phenomenon to be one of the 
six major puzzles in international macroeconomics.  
A third empirical anomaly relates to the ‘news’ aspect of the first generation models. 
The rational expectations assumption underlying the first generation models implies 
that the exchange rates can only change at any given moment of time as a result of 
‘news’ in the fundamentals. It is fair to conclude now that this feature of the existing 
models has also been rejected by the data. There is evidence that a large part of the 
movements of the exchange rate cannot be associated with news (see Goodhart 
(1989) and Goodhart & Figliuoli (1991)). More recent analysis using structural VARs 
comes to a similar conclusion.  Unanticipated shocks in the fundamental variables 
explain only a small fraction of the unanticipated changes in the exchange rates. 
Typically over forecast horizons of up to one year, news in output, inflation, and 
interest rates explains less than 5% of the total unanticipated variance of the 
exchange rate. About 95% of the latter is attributable to the news in the exchange 
rate itself (De Boeck (2000), Altavilla (2000))2. 
From this evidence it is clear that the first generation models in which the exchange 
rate is driven by news in the fundamentals in a linear way must be called into 
question as a representation of the foreign exchange market.   
The rejection of the first generation models of the exchange rate has led researchers 
into two different directions. The first one has led to what one could call the ‘second 
generation’ models, as exemplified by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). In these models 
the starting point is utility maximisation of a representative agent. These models 
typically lead to the conclusion that the coefficients of the reduced form equations 
of the first generation models do not have to be constant. These coefficients vary as 
a result of the underlying stochastic disturbances and of changing policy regimes.  
This is an important insight. The trouble, however, is that the ‘second generation’ 
models have led to few testable propositions that would allow for their refutation. As 
long as these testable propositions are not formulated it is difficult to evaluate the 
scientific strength of these ‘second generation’ models. 
A second direction taken by researchers in their search for an alternative to the ‘first 
generation’ models has been to introduce non-linearities into the model (see De 
Grauwe and Dewachter (1993), Frankel and Froot (1990), Kilian and Taylor (2001), Kurz 
and Motolese (2001)). These models are characterised by the existence of several 
agents using different information sets (e.g. chartists and fundamentalists) and/or by 
                                                 
2  Again there is some evidence that over longer forecast horizons, the news in fundamentals becomes 
more important. It remains relatively low, however, remaining far below explaining 50% of the total 
variance.  
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the existence of transactions costs. The insight provided by these models is that they 
predict frequent structural breaks in linear exchange rate equations, and that they 
generate changes in the exchange rates that are unrelated to news about the 
underlying fundamentals. 
In this paper we analyse the (possibly non-linear) nature of the relationship between 
exchange rate changes and the news in the underlying fundamentals. More 
specifically we test whether this relationship is subject to regime switches over time. In 
order to do so, we use a version of the Markov-switching autoregressive model 
popularised by Hamilton (1989). In addition, we perform the Markov-switching analysis 
both on data of low inflation and high inflation countries. This comparison between 
low and high inflation countries will allow us to gain additional insight about the 
nature of the relation between exchange rates and the fundamentals. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the model and 
discuss some of its features. In section 3 we describe the estimation process, and in 
section 4 we present the results. Finally in section 5 we analyse the implications of our 
results for exchange rate modelling. 
 
2. The model 
 
The non-linear model we consider is derived from the Markov-switching 
autoregressive (MS-AR) models popularised by Hamilton (1989) as a way of 
characterizing expansions and contractions in empirical business cycle research. The 
MS-AR framework can be readily extended to various settings (see Krolzig, 1997, for 
an overview). However, the use of the Markov-switching model to analyse the 
exchange rate market is rather new 3. Furthermore, all these applications have 
assumed switches in either the mean, variance or autoregressive coefficients of the 
models considered. In our analysis, we use the Markov-switching model to detect 
switches in the exogenous regressors and or intercept. Hence, our model is written as: 
ttstst tt
funde eeba +D+=D ' ~ ( )2,0 sN  
 
Where teD  represents the change of the exchange rate in month t relative to month 
t-12 and tfundD the relative change in the fundamental(s) of the home country in 
month t relative to month t-12 compared to the US, so: 
                                                 
3 Examples can be found in Engel and Hamilton (1990), Engel and Hakkio (1994), Jeanne and Masson 
(1998) and Fratzscher (1999). 
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Further, we postulate the existence of an unobserved variable (denoted ts ) that 
takes on the value one or two. This variable characterises the state or regime that the 
process is in at date t. We assume that the stochastic process generating these 
unobservable regimes is an ergodic, irreducible Markov chain defined by the 
transition probabilities4: 
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Hence the process for ts  is presumed to depend on past realizations of e and s only 
through ts -1.  
Note that an attractive feature of the model is that a variety of behaviour is allowed. 
No prior information regarding the dates or the sizes of the two states is required. In 
particular there could be asymmetries in the persistence of the two states and we do 
not impose that the coefficients in both states should be either significant or 
insignificant. 
3. Estimation process 
 
To estimate the aforementioned model, we choose to work with both monthly and 
quarterly data on the exchange rates and various fundamentals as gathered from 
the International Financial Statistics tape of the International Monetary Fund for both 
high and low inflation countries. For the high inflation countries, data on the home 
currency price for the exchange rate, the money supply, the inflation, the money 
market rate and the lending rate was obtained for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia 
and Ecuador. For the low inflation countries, the same data and also observations on 
the government bond yield and the trade balance were obtained for Germany, 
France, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US. See Appendix A for more details on the data. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of this model can be performed by relying either 
on a numerical maximization technique or on the EM-Algorithm as described by 
Hamilton (1990) and Krolzig (1997). In this paper, both approaches were adopted 
whereby a Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno (BFGS) routine achieved the 
                                                 
4 A Markov Chain is said to be ergodic if exactly one of the eigenvalues of the transition matrix is unity and 
all other eigenvalues are inside the unit circle. Under this condition there exists a stationary or unconditional 
probability distribution of the regimes. If the ergodic probabilities are strictly positive, such that all regimes 
have a positive unconditional probability, the process is called irreducible (Krolzig, 1997). 
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numerical maximization5. For the EM-Algorithm, standard errors were computed in the 
way suggested by Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974). 
As the results from estimating the model were consistent over the various 
methodologies and time coverages, only the monthly results as obtained by the BFGS 
routine are reported below, the quarterly results can be found in Appendix C. As 
starting values, we choose the OLS regression results for one regime and zero for the 
other regime. We also experimented with other starting values, but the results never 
changed substantially. 
 
 
                                                 
5 For an elaboration on the estimation techniques, see Appendix B. 
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4. The results 
 
We first present the results of the univariate analysis, i.e. the analysis in which we apply 
the Markov switching model to univariate explanations of the exchange rate 
changes. In the second step we apply the model to the multivariate case. 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
 
Table 1 shows the Wald tests for the low inflation countries.  As will be remembered 
the Wald test allows us to test for the equality of the intercepts and the slopes in the 
different regimes identified by the Markov switching model. We have considered 
three scenarios for the regime switches. In the first one we test whether there are 
switches in the intercept and the slope, in the second case we only allow for switches 
in the intercept, and in the third case we only allow for switches in the slopes.  
A first conclusion from table 1 is that the model identifies significant switches in the 
intercept and in the slope in most cases. In particular switches in the slope are 
significant in all but three cases, and switches in the intercept in all but two cases.   
Table 1  
Wald test results for low inflation countries 
 
Changes in Inflation 
 Switches in the intercept and slope Switches in the 
intercept 
Switches in the slope 
 H0:P11=1-
p12 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0:P11=1-
p12 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0:P11=1-
p12 
H0: 
b1= b2 
Germany 29.11 46.58 0.02 3.76 23.46 34.13 5.56 
France 141.06 0.77 6.96 0.00 0.00 112.72 19.02 
Italy 39.08 49.15 3.53 1.16 4.09 38.77 8.17 
UK 29.56 3.28 5.27 0.07 0.12 90.87 7.46 
Japan 13.81 45.69 39.77 0.93 3.89 49.60 0.54 
Changes in money supply 
Germany 6.69 0.34 0.12 15.80 24.59 42.72 14.40 
France 20.93 52.98 2.80 20.91 44.44 19.92 144.42 
Italy 35.00 8.30 0.12 33.77 46.42 1.92 0.09 
UK 35.79 36.11 1.20 39.01 42.54 1.10 5.27 
Japan 5.69 9.48 2.52 3.71 19.40 11.02 0.84 
Changes in government bond yield 
Germany 33.70 27.88 0.03 33.41 74.36 0.62 4.70 
France 65.84 64.04 4.16 48.63 66.76 0.33 5.48 
Italy 5.04 6.35 0.83 4.27 10.85 0.49 3.88 
UK 5.84 2.92 5.81 23.30 18.70 92.31 88.01 
Japan 4.06 1.14 0.14 5.00 5.25 14.51 5.67 
 
Tables 2 to 4 present the estimates of the intercepts and slope coefficients obtained 
in the different regimes. The most remarkable result is that the slope coefficients often 
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switch between a significant and a non-significant value, suggesting that in one 
regime the variable in question (inflation, money, output) has a significant effect on 
the exchange rate, while in the other regime its effect is not significantly different from 
zero.  There are cases, however, where the switches are between two non-significant 
coefficients (this is the case for Japan and Italy, and for industrial production). It 
should be noted that the switch is never between two significant coefficients.  
Table 2  
Estimates fit to individual low inflation country data, t= 73:II to 98:11 
Equation: )(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
e
ee
p
pp
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and p stands for 
the inflation 
Parameter Germany France Italy UK Japan 
a -0.33 
(0.22) 
-0.11 
(0.21) 
0.07 
(0.14) 
0.15 
(0.19) 
-0.23** 
(0.10) 
b1 -0.64
** 
(0.17) 
0.26** 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
-0.06* 
(0.04) 
b2 0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.81* 
(0.42) 
0.29 
(0.30) 
-0.15 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
P11 0.82
** 
(0.10) 
0.92** 
(0.02) 
0.86** 
(0.07) 
0.94** 
(0.05) 
0.95** 
(0.11) 
P22 0.93
** 
(0.05) 
0.96** 
(0.07) 
0.94** 
(0.05) 
0.94** 
(0.07) 
0.95** 
(0.07) 
s2 2.60** 
(0.12) 
2.52** 
(0.11) 
2.49** 
(0.09) 
2.54** 
(0.10) 
2.82** 
(0.12) 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
 
Table 3  
Estimates fit to individual low inflation country data, t= 73:II to 98:11 
)(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
M
MM
e
ee
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and M stands for 
the money supply 
Parameter Germany France Italy UK Japan 
a -0.01** 
(0.10) 
-0.41* 
(0.24) 
0.41** 
(0.14) 
0.49 
(0.32) 
-0.59** 
(0.19) 
b1 -0.12
** 
(0.04) 
24.98** 
(6.33) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.13 
(0.10) 
b2 0.09 
(0.07) 
-2.24 
(2.22) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.48 
(0.36) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
P11 0.91
** 
(0.11) 
0.85** 
(0.12) 
0.77** 
(0.27) 
0.85** 
(0.12) 
0.97** 
(0.07) 
P22 0.92
** 
(0.07) 
0.91** 
(0.07) 
0.83** 
(0.21) 
0.27** 
(0.11) 
0.75** 
(0.22) 
s2 2.63** 
(0.12) 
2.52** 
(0.14) 
2.59** 
(0.09) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
2.76** 
(0.06) 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
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Table 4  
Estimates fit to individual low inflation country data, t= 73:II to 98:11 
)(
12
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12
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t
tt
j
t
tt
GBY
GBYGBY
e
ee
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and GBY stands 
for government bond yield 
Parameter Germany France Italy UK Japan 
a -0.16 
(0.41) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.33** 
(0.15) 
0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.24 
(0.15) 
b1 -2.05
** 
(0.82) 
-1.65** 
(0.52) 
1.66 
(1.15) 
3.80** 
(1.26) 
1.60 
(1.03) 
b2 -0.39 
(0.65) 
3.33 
(2.12) 
-1.46 
(1.57) 
0.25 
(0.36) 
-2.51 
(1.70) 
P11 0.78
** 
(0.53) 
0.94** 
(0.07) 
0.60** 
(0.26) 
0.97** 
(0.03) 
0.93** 
(0.10) 
P22 0.18
** 
(0.41) 
0.72** 
(0.39) 
0.29** 
(0.41) 
0.99** 
(0.01) 
0.85** 
(0.14) 
s2 2.77** 
(0.39) 
2.59** 
(0.10) 
2.48** 
(0.12) 
2.53** 
(0.10) 
2.76** 
(0.11) 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
 
How do these results compare with the results obtained for the high inflation 
countries? Tables 5 to 9 give an answer to this question. In table 5 we present the 
Wald tests for the significance of the switches in regimes (intercepts and slopes) in the 
high inflation countries. The contrast with the low inflation countries is striking. We find 
significant switches in regimes in all countries, but these switches are never due to 
switches in the slope. They are caused exclusively by switches in the intercept. Thus in 
the high inflation countries there have been switches in the average level of inflation, 
but the explanatory power of the independent variables (inflation, money supply, 
interest rate) has remained unchanged. This result contrasts with the results of the low 
inflation countries in which the explanatory power of these independent variables 
appears to switch frequently.  
In tables 6 to 9 we show the intercepts and the slopes in the different regimes for the 
high inflation countries. We observe that the slope coefficients are almost always 
significantly different from zero (although they do not always have the expected 
sign). 
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Table 5  
Wald test results for high inflation countries 
 
Changes in Inflation 
 Switches in the intercept and slope Switches in the 
intercept 
Switches in the slope 
 H0:P11=1-
p12 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0:P11=1-
p12 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0:P11=1-
p12 
H0: 
b1= b2 
Argentina 0.62 218.00 0.63 78.64 98.91 0.00 0.00 
Bolivia 0.28 842.31 0.42 0.15 4.45 0.20 0.00 
Brazil 457.51 150.26 59.66 439.19 481.25 100.70 0.00 
Columbia 129.93 2.93 0.57 131.47 71.74 0.00 0.01 
Ecuador 0.27 305.76 7.38 0.17 228.36 0.11 0.05 
Changes in money supply 
Argentina 6.11 260.15 0.01 0.92 220.07 0.01 0.00 
Bolivia 11.13 97.68 0.08 13.27 127.24 8.45 0.01 
Brazil 530.80 250.01 67.13 403.51 85.03 5.51 0.00 
Columbia 9.47 46.20 2.50 10.26 17.74 0.25 0.00 
Ecuador 198.76 205.85 1.15 0.08 19.14 6.76 0.00 
Changes in lending rate 
Argentina - - - - - - - 
Bolivia 51.24 17.58 0.53 128.11 18.19 0.05 0.01 
Brazil 670.22 809.02 2.88 275.44 938.03 0.34 0.04 
Columbia 3.10 72.58 36.12 2.67 40.94 1.63 0.00 
Ecuador 0.00 406.69 3.32 0.00 46.43 2.97 2.17 
 
Table 6 
Estimates fit to individual high inflation country data 
)(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
e
ee
p
pp
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and p stands for 
the inflation 
Parameter Argentina Bolivia Brazil Columbia Ecuador 
a1 160.70
** 
(1.87) 
0.64** 
(0.30) 
26.64** 
(1.07) 
2.59** 
(0.34) 
53.02** 
(0.58) 
a2 6.01 
(15.44) 
0.0003** 
(0.00004) 
3.87**  
(0.56) 
1.14** 
(0.29) 
4.45 
(3.16) 
b -0.00002** 
(0.00) 
0.0006** 
(0.0001) 
0.003** 
(0.0004) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.01) 
P11 0.16
** 
(0.11) 
0.39** 
(0.18) 
0.89** 
(0.04) 
0.97** 
(0.02) 
0.11** 
(0.01) 
P22 0.98
** 
(0.17) 
0.73** 
(0.15) 
0.96** 
(0.01) 
0.98** 
(0.01) 
0.95** 
(0.11) 
s2 14.83** 
(0.11) 
1.61** 
(0.02) 
6.48** 
(0.31) 
1.15** 
(0.06) 
1.88** 
(0.08) 
Period 76:1-91:1 85:2-00:11 80:12-98:1 73:1-00:11 82:5-00:1 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
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Table 7 
Estimates fit to individual high inflation country data 
)(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
M
MM
e
ee
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and M stands for 
the money supply 
Parameter Argentina Bolivia Brazil Columbia Ecuador 
a1 161.05
** 
(9.64) 
0.63** 
(0.30) 
28.96** 
(0.86) 
3.84** 
(0.35) 
2.12** 
(0.53) 
a2 5.86 
(4.06) 
0.21** 
(0.002) 
3.64** 
(0.39) 
-0.58 
(0.99) 
37.89** 
(0.03) 
b -0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.01** 
(0.001) 
0.0009** 
(0.0008) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.04) 
P11 0.16
** 
(0.08) 
0.96** 
(0.18) 
0.78** 
(0.04) 
0.58** 
(0.08) 
0.97** 
(0.07) 
P22 0.98
** 
(0.01) 
0.96** 
(0.20) 
0.97** 
(0.01) 
0.91** 
(0.13) 
0.05** 
(0.003) 
s2 14.60** 
(0.002) 
0.25** 
(0.02) 
5.82** 
(0.24) 
1.50** 
(0.18) 
2.83** 
(0.11) 
Period 76:1-91:1 89:12-00:11 73:1-98:1 94:12-00:11 94:12-00:11 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
 
Table 8 
Estimates fit to individual high inflation country data 
)(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
LR
LRLR
e
ee
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and LR stands 
for the lending rate 
Parameter Argentina Bolivia Brazil Columbia Ecuador 
a1 - 1.39
** 
(0.05) 
30.10** 
(0.81) 
1.62** 
(0.19) 
2.45** 
(0.12) 
a2 - 0.51
** 
(0.20) 
4.01** 
(0.38) 
-3.31** 
(0.02) 
40.68** 
(0.54) 
b 
- 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
0.35 
(0.56) 
-0.05 
(0.20) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
P11 - 
0.91** 
(0.08) 
0.78** 
(0.04) 
0.98** 
(0.18) 
0.97** 
(0.01) 
P22 - 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.97** 
(0.01) 
0.43** 
(0.17) 
0.13** 
(0.56) 
s2 
- 
0.36** 
(0.02) 
5.92** 
(0.23) 
1.50** 
(0.19) 
3.13** 
(0.11) 
Period - 87:1-00:11 73:1-98:1 86:1-00:11 82:5-99:11 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
 
We also tested for asymmetry in the regimes, i.e. we checked whether the regime the 
economy was in the previous period affected the current regime (see tables 10 and 
11). We found that in various cases there was a significant asymmetry.  
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Finally we analysed the persistence (duration) of the regimes. The results are also 
shown in tables 10 and 11. For the low inflation countries (table 10) we find that the 
regime in which the slope is not significant usually lasts longer than the regime in 
which the slope is significant.  In the high inflation countries we find a strong 
asymmetry in the persistence of the regimes whereby one is long lasting (25 to 50 
months) and the other is very short in timing (1.2 to 9.1 months).  More detail is 
obtained from the transition probabilities, which are presented in appendix D.  
 
Table 10  
Test of asymmetry in regimes for the low inflation countries (switches in the slope) 
 
 Germany France Italy UK Japan 
Ho: p11=1-p21 
Change in inflation 34.13 112.72 38.77 90.87 49.60 
Change in money 42.72 19.92 1.92 1.10 11.02 
Change in government 
bond yield 
0.62 0.33 0.49 92.31 14.51 
Expected duration (months) of state 1: (1-p11)
-1 
Change in inflation 5.56 12.50 7.14 16.67 20.00 
Change in money 11.11 6.67 4.35 6.67 33.33 
Change in government 
bond yield 
4.55 16.67 2.50 33.33 14.29 
Expected duration (months) of state 2: (1-p22)
-1 
Change in inflation 14.29 25.00 16.67 16.67 20.00 
Change in money 12.50 11.11 7.69 3.70 4.00 
Change in government 
bond yield 
5.56 1.39 3.45 100 6.67 
 
Table 11 
Test of asymmetry in regimes for the high inflation countries (switches in the 
intercept) 
 
 Argentina Bolivia Brazil Columbia Ecuador 
Ho: p11=1-p21 
Change in inflation 78.64 0.15 439.19 131.47 0.17 
Change in money 0.92 13.27 403.51 10.26 0.08 
Change in lending rate - 128.11 275.44 2.67 0.001 
Expected duration (months) of state 1: (1-p11)
-1 
Change in inflation 1.19 1.64 9.09 33.33 1.64 
Change in money 1.19 25.00 8.33 2.38 33.33 
Change in lending rate - 11.11 8.33 50.00 33.33 
Expected duration (months) of state 2: (1-p22)
-1 
Change in inflation 50.00 3.70 25.00 50.00 3.70 
Change in money 50.00 25.00 33.33 11.11 1.05 
Change in lending rate - 50.00 33.33 1.75 1.15 
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4.2 Multivariate analysis 
 
In the multivariate analysis we analyse the regime switches in regression equations 
explaining the changes in the exchange rates by changes in relative money supplies, 
changes in relative inflation and changes in relative bond yields. We analyse switches 
in all the coefficients taken together, and then in the coefficients separately. As 
before we apply the analysis to low and high inflation countries.  
Tables 12 and 13 present the Wald tests for the low and high inflation countries. Our 
results lead to broadly similar results as in the univariate case. For the low inflation 
countries we find many significant switches both in the intercept and in the slope 
coefficients. For the high inflation countries we only find switches in the intercept, but 
never in the slope coefficients.  
Table 12  
Wald test results for low inflation countries 
 
 Switches in the intercept and slope Switches 
in the 
intercept 
Switches in the slope 
 H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0: 
g1 = g2 
H0: 
d1 = d2 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0: 
g1 = g2 
H0: 
d1 = d2 
Germany 4.85 4.75 0.02 8.59 47.42 7.03 3.06 18.46 
France 47.99 3.20 0.01 1.36 25.42 1.22 0.02 10.94 
Italy 22.41 4.76 1.71 3.24 43.12 17.68 6.72 0.01 
UK 18.80 12.90 1.10 1.31 1.13 4.30 0.002 2.27 
Japan - - - - 47.48 91.34 33.78 3.35 
 
Table 13  
Wald test results for high inflation countries 
 
 Switches in the intercept and slope Switches 
in the 
intercept 
Switches in the slope 
 H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0: 
g1 = g2 
H0: 
d1 = d2 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0: 
g1 = g2 
H0: 
d1 = d2 
Argentina 105.78 288.61 12.23 14.70 - - - - 
Bolivia 16.91 15.32 0.51 8.42 110.42 1.10 0.71 1.46 
Brazil 160.52 100.60 36.78 1.00 423.69 1.38 1.47 0.05 
Columbia 40.48 15.08 1.10 5.62 52.97 0.30 1.87 0.003 
Ecuador 3.93 61.12 21.26 0.27 384.87 - - - 
 
Tables 14 and 15 present the estimated coefficients in the different regimes. We find 
again that in the case of the low inflation countries the switches mostly occur 
between significant and non-significant slope coefficients (with the exception of the 
coefficients of the relative money supplies). In the case of the high inflation countries 
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the slope coefficients are almost always significant, and the switches only occur 
between the intercepts that are always significant.  
Table 14 
Estimates fit to individual low inflation country data, t= 73:II to 98:11 
)()()(
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- -+
-
+
-
+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
j
t
tt
jj
t
tt
GBY
GBYGBY
M
MM
e
ee
dg
p
pp
ba , j = 1 or 2 
 
Parameter Germany France Italy UK Japan 
a1 0.66 
(0.72) 
1.75** 
(0.43) 
4.07** 
(1.01) 
-0.52** 
(0.24) 
- 
a2 -1.10
** 
(0.25) 
-1.36** 
(0.37) 
-0.41 
(0.35) 
4.26** 
(1.15) 
- 
b1 -0.56
** 
(0.16) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
-0.21 
(0.14) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
- 
b2 -0.14 
(0.12) 
2.25* 
(1.18) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
-1.13** 
(0.35) 
- 
g1 0.00 
(0.11) 
-0.29* 
(0.16) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.15 
(0.74) 
- 
g2 -0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.17 
(1.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
2.02 
(1.86) 
- 
d1 -4.11 
(5.10) 
-0.73 
(0.48) 
0.64 
(0.52) 
0.83** 
(0.39) 
- 
d2 0.10
** 
(0.02) 
-1.74** 
(0.76) 
-0.41 
(0.28) 
-0.39 
(0.91) 
- 
P11 0.89
** 
(0.10) 
0.77** 
(0.07) 
0.68** 
(0.09) 
0.96** 
(0.02) 
- 
P22 0.94
** 
(0.09) 
0.82** 
(0.09) 
0.95** 
(0.03) 
0.85** 
(0.09) 
- 
s2 2.47** 
(0.14) 
2.09** 
(0.16) 
2.08** 
(0.11) 
2.28** 
(0.10) 
- 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
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Table 15 
Estimates fit to individual high inflation country data 
)()()(
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
-
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-
-
-
-
-
- -+
-
+
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+=
-
t
tt
t
tt
t
tt
j
t
tt
GBY
GBYGBY
M
MM
e
ee
dg
p
pp
ba , j = 1 or 2 
 
Parameter Bolivia Brazil Columbia 
a1 0.54
** 
(0.04) 
23.30** 
(0.92) 
2.74** 
(0.75) 
a2 0.10
** 
(0.05) 
4.13** 
(0.50) 
-2.92** 
(1.09) 
b1 0.03
** 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0.0008) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
g1 -0.002
** 
(0.001) 
-0.01** 
(0.0006) 
0.11** 
(0.03) 
d1 -0.002 
(0.002) 
1.45 
(1.01) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
P11 0.96
** 
(0.03) 
0.90** 
(0.04) 
0.59** 
(0.16) 
P22 0.97
** 
(0.02) 
0.96** 
(0.02) 
0.93** 
(0.04) 
s2 0.21** 
(0.01) 
5.58** 
(0.25) 
1.46** 
(0.04) 
Period 89:12-00:11 80:12-98:1 94:12-00:11 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
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5. Theoretical Issues 
 
The results discussed in the previous section can be summarized as follows. The 
relation between the exchange rate and the fundamentals of low inflation countries 
is characterized by frequent regimes shifts. We found that the coefficients of these 
fundamentals change over time quite often from significant values to insignificant 
ones, and vice versa. This feature is absent in the exchange rate equations of high 
inflation countries. In those countries we find that the coefficients of the fundamentals 
are quite stable (only the intercept switches).  
These results suggest that for the high inflation countries the linear first generation 
model may be the right framework for explaining the movements of these countries’ 
exchange rates. This is not the case for the low inflation countries, whose exchange 
rates cannot be explained by a stable relation with underlying fundamentals.  
Any explanation of these empirical results must be capable of accounting for the 
differences observed in the stability of the exchange rate equations between low 
and high inflation countries. There are two alternative explanations. The first 
alternative is based on the second-generation model. We claim that this explanation 
is unsatisfactory. The second-generation model is based on explicit utility 
maximization of a representative agent. In this model the structural instability of the 
coefficients in the exchange rate equations can be explained by shifts in the 
underlying stochastic structure, which may or may not be induced by changes in 
policy regimes. The contrasting evidence between high and low inflation countries, 
however, makes this explanation implausible. If anything, high inflation countries 
experience stronger changes in the underlying stochastic structure (mainly induced 
by shifts in policy regimes) than low inflation countries. And yet it is in the high inflation 
countries that the linear first generation model seems to be dong well while it fails for 
the low inflation countries.  
For this reason our preferred explanation is based on non-linearities. In what follows, 
we outline the nature of two non-linear features that in our view are capable of 
explaining the unstable relation between the exchange rate and its underlying 
fundamentals in low inflation countries. Here we only briefly sketch the nature of these 
non-linearities and how these affect exchange rate models. We intend to do further 
research to formalise these ideas.  
A first non-linearity has been stressed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), who show that 
many of the current puzzles in international macroeconomics can be explained by 
transaction costs. In our case, introducing transaction costs can contribute to 
understanding the difference in the relationship between the exchange rate and its 
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fundamentals for low inflation and stable in high inflation countries. To see this, 
consider the following setup. 
The existence of transaction costs (say as a fixed proportion of the prices of products) 
defines a band in which arbitrage relations, such as the PPP relation, do not hold. This 
is the case in both the low and high inflation countries. Now introduce exogenous 
shocks in the underlying fundamental values of the exchange rate. In the low inflation 
countries, many shocks tend to be relatively small relative to the transaction cost 
band (e.g. inflation shocks). Hence, arbitrage will not be profitable in these cases and 
will remain absent. Some shocks, however, are large relative to the transactions cost 
band implying that arbitrage will take place. As a consequence, the relation 
between exchange rates and their underlying fundamentals will be unstable. In 
contrast, in the high inflation countries, shocks in the fundamentals (especially 
nominal shocks) are always large relative to the transactions costs band, imposing 
strong arbitrage relations. This implies that the relation between the exchange rate 
and its fundamentals remains stable. 
A second non-linear feature can be introduced which is capable of explaining our 
empirical findings. This is based on diversity of opinion (see for instance De Grauwe 
and Dewachter (1993), De Grauwe (1994) and Kilian and Taylor (2001). The essential 
ingredient of such a non-linearity is the hypothesis that economic agents use different 
information sets. In general, two kind of agents, ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘chartists’ (or 
informed traders and noise traders) can be considered. The fundamentalist is forward 
looking in that he computes the equilibrium (or fundamental) exchange rate to 
predict future exchange rate movements, while the chartist is backward looking, 
relying on extrapolations of past exchange rate movements for his forecasts. 
The fundamentalist is uncertain about the fundamental value of the exchange rate. 
(This uncertainty may be due to the existence of a transaction cost band which blurs 
the relation between exchange rates and their fundamentals). As a result, when the 
exchange rate is close to its fundamental value, fundamentalists take few positions. 
The market is then dominated by the chartists. Conversely, as the exchange rate 
moves away from its fundamental value, fundamentalists move in the market again, 
and become more important to determine the exchange rate.   
This model leads to a speculative dynamics in which the exchange rate appears to 
have a life of its own. This model may be appropriate for low inflation countries where 
there is often great uncertainty about the true equilibrium value of the exchange 
rate. (Note again that this uncertainty is probably linked to the existence of a 
transactions cost band which in low inflation countries is large relative to the size of 
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the shocks in the fundamentals). In the high inflation, however, this uncertainty about 
the equilibrium value of the exchange rate is less pronounced. As a result, the market 
will be dominated by fundamentalist.  In this case, exchange rate movements will be 
linked to shocks in the underlying fundamental values.  
As stressed earlier, this is only a broad sketch of non-linearities in exchange rate 
models capable of explaining the results obtained in this paper. Further theoretical 
analysis will be necessary to substantiate this claim.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Characterizing the nature of the relationship between exchange rate changes and 
the news in its underlying fundamentals has long been an objective of empirical 
international macroeconomics. Although this research has contributed to our 
understanding of the behaviour of the exchange rates, it is also true that this 
empirical research has been unable to validate the existing theoretical models. In 
particular, the ‘first generation models’ of the exchange rates that were developed 
during the 1970s have been rejected at least when using data of the major industrial 
countries. The ‘second generation models’ based on explicit utility maximisation of 
agents have not produced sharp enough testable propositions allowing for their 
refutation by the data. As a result, they have not been confirmed nor refuted.   
In this paper, we test whether the relationship between the nominal exchange rate 
and the news in its underlying fundamentals has non-linear features. In order to do so, 
we developed a Markov switching model and applied the model for a sample of low 
inflation and high inflation countries. 
The empirical analysis shows that for the high inflation countries the first generation 
models appear to work well: the relationship between news in the fundamentals and 
the exchange rate changes is stable and always significant. This is not the case, 
however, for the low inflation countries, where frequent regime switches occur. This 
finding casts doubts about the capacity of the second-generation models to explain 
the facts.  
We discussed two non-linear models that are capable of explaining our empirical 
findings. A first model is based on the existence of transaction costs; a second one 
starts from the existence of different types of agents using different information to 
forecast the future exchange rate. We conjectured that such non-linear models 
would be fruitful to understand the behaviour of exchange rates.   
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Appendix A. Data definitions and sources 
 
The ten countries included in the analysis are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK. Information on the home 
currency-dollar exchange rate and six fundamentals was retrieved on a monthly and 
quarterly basis. More specifically, this set of fundamentals covers: 
 
1. The inflation for the country concerned 
2. The money supply for the country under scrutiny, for all countries this 
represents M2 except for the UK where M0 was used 
3. The Money Market Rate, which is used as a measure of the short term interest 
rate 
4. The lending rate and the long-term government bond yield which are both 
proxies of the long-term interest rate. The latter was however only available for 
the low inflation countries 
5. Industrial production 
6. The trade balance relative to the GDP 
 
In table A1 below, the time period used for each separate fundamental is report for 
the monthly data. For industrial production and the trade balance relative to the 
GDP the same time periods were used. Both fundamentals were only applied for the 
low inflation countries, as for the high inflation countries either the data was not 
available or the time period covered was too short to be of any use. For the quarterly 
observations, the same time period was applied but then the figures were 
transformed to quarters rather than months. 
 
Table A1 
Time periods covered by the various fundamentals  
 
 F u n d a m e n t a l s  
 Inflation M o n e y  
s u p p l y  
M o n e y  
market rate 
L e n d i n g  
r a t e  
Government 
Bond Y ie ld  
Industr ia l  
Production 
Low inflation countries 
Germany 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 77:5-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 
F r a n c e  73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-86:01 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 
I t a l y  73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 83:8-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 
U K  73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 
J a p a n  73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 73:1-98:11 
High inflation countries 
Argentina 76:1-91:1 76:1-91:1 79:3-91:1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
B o l i v i a  85:2-00:11 89:12-00:11 95:1-00:11 87:1-00:11 n.a. n.a. 
B r a z i l  80:12-98:1 73:1-00:11 73:1-98:1 73:1-98:11 n.a. n.a. 
Columbia 73:1-00:11 94:12-00:11 95:3-00:10 86:1-00:11 n.a. n.a. 
E c u a d o r 82:5-00:1 82:5-00:1 82:5-00:1 82:5-99:11 n.a. n.a. 
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Appendix B. Maximum likelihood estimation of the Markov-switching 
model6 
 
Introduction 
 
In this appendix, more attention is devoted to the determination of the various 
population parameters of the Markov-switching model. In a first part, we therefore 
rewrite the model in a state-space representation, which has been proven useful for 
the study of time series with unobservable states. Next we write down the log 
likelihood function that has to be optimised and we subject the EM algorithm to 
closer scrutiny. In the third section, the computation of the standard errors is discussed 
and finally in the last section, the derivation of Wald test as reported in this paper is 
explained. 
 
The regime shift function and the state space representation 
 
At this stage it is useful to define the parameter shifts more clearly by formulating the 
system as a single equation by introducing ‘dummy’ indicator variables: 
î
í
ì =
==
,0
1
)(
otherwise
msif
msI tt
 
Where m = 1 or 2. Now we can collect all information about the realization of the 
Markov chain in the vector xt as, whereby xt denotes the unobserved state of the 
system:  
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The state space representation of the model now consists of the following set of 
measurement and transition equation: 
 
1. Measurement or observation equation 
ttttt uuBXe +=D x
' ~ ),0( 2sN , 
 where ),1( '' tt fundX D=  
                                                 
6 This section derives on Hamilton (1990) and Krolzig (1997) 
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 and where ú
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2. State or transition equation 
11 ++ += ttt vFxx  
 
Maximum likelihood estimation and the EM algorithm 
 
In order to fix the parameters of the aforementioned equation we can rely both on 
the classical method of maximum likelihood estimation and the EM Algorithm. Both 
have been applied in this paper and will be discussed in more details below. 
 
Under the assumption that the observed variable, teD , is drawn from an N(m ,s2) 
distribution, and the unobserved state is presumed to have been generated by some 
probability distribution, for which the unconditional probability that ts  takes on the 
value j is denoted by jp :  
 
{ } jt jsp pq == ;  
 
where q represents the population parameters that should be determined, so:  
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In this case the unconditional density for teD  is the sum over j=1 and 2 of the density 
distribution functions of teD  given state ts   
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If the regime variable ts  is distributed i.i.d. across different dates t, then the log 
likelihood function of the observed data can now be calculated from the above 
expression as: 
 
å
=
D=
T
t
tefL
1
);(log)( qq
 
 
The maximum likelihood estimate of q is obtained by maximizing subject to the 
constraint that 121 =+pp  and 1³jp  for j= 1 and 2. This can be achieved using the 
numerical methods or using the EM algorithm. The latter approach is an iterative 
maximum likelihood estimation technique consisting of two steps (see Krolzig,1997): 
 
In the expectation step (E), the unobserved states xt are estimated by their smoothed 
probabilities, 
Tt
xˆ , while in the maximization step, estimates of ( )2211 ,, ppql º  are 
obtained as a solution of the first order conditions of L(q). In table 1 below, this 
algorithm is depicted in more detail. General results available for the EM algorithm 
indicate that the likelihood function increases in the number of iterations i. Finally, a 
fixed-point of this iteration schedule )1()( -= jj ll  coincides with the maximum of the 
likelihood function. 
 
Standard errors and the EM Algorithm 
 
In order to compute the variance-covariance matrix and hence the standard errors 
when using the EM algorithm, we employed the way suggested by Berndt, Hall, Hall 
and Hausman (1974), where ( )qis  represents the first derivatives of the individual log 
likelihood contributions, also known as scores: 
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Table 1  
The EM Algorithm 
 
I. Initialization )0(l  
 
II. Expectation Step 
 
A. Filtering (forward recursion t=1, …, T) ( ( )1,..., eeE tt DD=D : 
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B. Smoothing (backward recursion t=1, T-1) 
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Forward recursion for t = t+2,… T 
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III. Maximization Step 
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IV. Iterate step II & III until Convergence, criterion: 8)1( 10 -+ £- ii ll  
 
Wald test 
 
There exist several ways to test hypotheses about parameters that are estimated by 
maximum likelihood. Here we have relied on the Wald test to check the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H0: p11 = 1 – p22 
H0: a1 = a2 
H0: b1 = b2 
 
For the Wald test, the test statistics for the above hypotheses are: 
 
H0: p11 = 1 – p22: 
( )[ ]
[ ] )1()ˆ,ˆv(oˆc2)ˆr(aˆv)ˆr(aˆv
ˆ1ˆ 2
22112211
2
2211 c»
++
--
pppp
pp
 
H0: a1 = a2: 
( )
)1(
)ˆ,ˆv(oˆc2)ˆr(aˆv)ˆr(aˆv
ˆˆ 2
2121
2
21 c
aaaa
aa »
-+
-
 (same methodology for b) 
 
Where var denotes the asymptotic variance and cov the asymptotic covariance 
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Appendix C: Estimation results using quarterly data 
 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
Table C1  
Wald test results for low inflation countries 
 
Changes in Inflation 
 Switches in the intercept and slope Switches in the 
intercept 
Switches in the slope 
 H0:p11=1-
p21 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0: p11=1-
p21 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: p11=1-
p21 
H0: 
b1= b2 
Germany 0.00 0.27 7.13 4.22 1.91 0.03 7.70 
France 34.20 1.44 0.43 8.18 1.23 2.89 25.77 
Italy 0.17 2.14 8.55 0.41 0.55 0.07 6.57 
UK n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Japan 0.78 50.96 7.00 0.00 0.00 2.28 80.37 
Changes in money supply 
Germany 0.26 11.27 19.03 8.31 2.79 1.41 4.11 
France 3.75 0.89 3.98 0.56 0.58 1.26 23.91 
Italy 0.83 2.70 1.99 0.28 -12.89 21.58 1.07 
UK 4.32 61.59 5.12 0.41 0.06 12.45 4.11 
Japan 1.22 0.21 0.26 0.12 0.00 0.46 18.47 
Changes in government bond yield 
Germany 0.32 0.16 16.87 0.00 0.00 0.26 17.12 
France 18.49 10.35 4.52 6.56 16.21 n.a. n.a. 
Italy 0.50 27.77 2.02 1.24 15.86 41.73 0.02 
UK 1.52 0.01 6.92 18.96 11.43 n.a. n.a. 
Japan 3.08 98.10 8.06 6.11 0.69 0.00 3.91 
 
Table C2  
Test of asymmetry in regimes for low inflation countries (switches in the slope) 
 
 Germany France Italy UK Japan 
Ho: p11=1-p21 
Change in inflation 0.03 2.89 0.03 n.a. 2.28 
Change in money 1.41 1.26 1.41 12.45 0.46 
Change in government 
bond yield 
0.26 18.49 0.02 1.52 0.00 
Expected duration (quarters) of state 1: (1-p11)
-1 
Change in inflation 1.92 1.09 1.12 n.a. 2.08 
Change in money 1.20 1.19 1.67 1.37 2.33 
Change in government 
bond yield 
3.13 1.02 33.33 1.06 1.02 
Expected duration (quarters) of state 2: (1-p22)
-1 
Change in inflation 1.85 1.23 1.07 n.a. 1.52 
Change in money 1.37 2.5 1.18 1.10 1.11 
Change in government 
bond yield 
4.54 1.32 1.25 1.27 1.28 
 
 28
 
Table C3  
Estimates fit to individual low inflation country data, t= 73:1 to 97:4 
Equation: )(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
e
ee
p
pp
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and p stands for 
the inflation 
Parameter Germany France Italy UK Japan 
a 0.05 
(0.66) 
0.32 
(0.66) 
0.80 
(0.73) 
n.a. 
-0.15 
(0.59) 
b1 -0.67
** 
(0.29) 
0.47 
(0.35) 
0.24 
(0.22) 
n.a. 
0.67** 
(0.19) 
b2 0.52 
(1.48) 
-1.31 
(1.42) 
0.02 
(0.30) 
n.a. 
-0.28* 
(0.16) 
P11 0.52
** 
(0.20) 
0.92** 
(0.09) 
0.89** 
(0.24) 
n.a. 
0.48** 
(0.11) 
P22 0.54
** 
(0.23) 
0.81** 
(0.23) 
0.93** 
(0.22) 
n.a. 
0.66** 
(0.08) 
s2 5.83** 
(0.44) 
5.68** 
(0.48) 
5.90** 
(0.44) 
n.a. 
3.79** 
(0.35) 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
 
Table C4  
Estimates fit to individual low inflation country data, t= 73:II to 98:11 
)(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
M
MM
e
ee
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and M stands for 
the money supply 
Parameter Germany France Italy UK Japan 
a -0.47 
(0.75) 
0.46 
(1.01) 
1.08 
(0.67) 
0.42 
(0.65) 
-0.95 
(0.57) 
b1 0.32
* 
(0.19) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
-0.36* 
(0.20) 
0.25 
(0.38) 
b2 -0.51 
(0.39) 
-1.11** 
(0.31) 
1.17* 
(0.90) 
0.16 
(0.18) 
0.26** 
(0.08) 
P11 0.83
** 
(0.21) 
0.84** 
(0.08) 
0.98** 
(0.12) 
0.73** 
(0.13) 
0.43** 
(0.85) 
P22 0.73
** 
(0.33) 
0.40** 
(0.20) 
0.80** 
(0.15) 
0.91** 
(0.11) 
0.10** 
(0.12) 
s2 5.64** 
(0.55) 
4.69** 
(0.49) 
5.51** 
(0.45) 
5.41** 
(0.43) 
5.85** 
(0.41) 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
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Table C5  
Estimates fit to individual low inflation country data, t= 73:II to 98:11 
)(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
GBY
GBYGBY
e
ee
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and GBY stands 
for government bond yield 
Parameter Germany France Italy UK Japan 
a1 -0.22 
(0.67) 
-0.32 
(0.59) 
12.82** 
(2.46) 
-0.13 
(0.63) 
-0.74 
(0.61) 
a2 - 6.13
** 
(1.93) 
0.30 
(0.63) 
2.87 
(2.00) - 
b1 -0.27 
(0.83) 
-0.41** 
(0.09) 
0.41 
(0.33) 
-0.04 
(0.28) 
-0.05 
(0.14) 
b2 -0.26
* 
(0.15) 
0.27 
(0.42) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.29) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
P11 0.32 
(8.35) 
0.98** 
(0.02) 
0.23** 
(0.21) 
0.94** 
(0.35) 
0.98** 
(0.26) 
P22 0.22 
(9.11) 
0.76** 
(0.16) 
0.93** 
(0.05) 
0.79** 
(0.45) 
0.78** 
(0.52) 
s2 5.95** 
(0.45) 
5.00** 
(0.39) 
4.81** 
(0.43) 
5.52** 
(0.45) 
6.08** 
(0.46) 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
 
 
Table C5  
Wald test results for high inflation countries 
 
Changes in Inflation 
 Switches in the intercept and slope Switches in the 
intercept 
Switches in the slope 
 H0:P11=1-
p12 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0:P11=1-
p12 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0:P11=1-
p12 
H0: 
b1= b2 
Argentina 0.00 1592.91 487.87 0.00 1848.37 14.52 0.00 
Bolivia 15.75 51.81 31.57 0.00 694.47 3.94 0.21 
Brazil 53.67 7.20 30.80 40.95 90.84 14.50 0.00 
Columbia 111.36 4.36 0.00 0.12 25.87 469.93 0.02 
Ecuador - - - - - - - 
Changes in money supply 
Argentina 0.00 2032.84 1904.29 0.00 1392.00 12.04 0.01 
Bolivia 0.00 126.34 17.29 0.00 409.10 14.50 0.30 
Brazil 105.88 22.16 46.95 50.28 162.76 0.70 0.00 
Columbia 5.67 0.06 1.49 5.14 56.85 48.05 42.14 
Ecuador - - - - - - - 
Changes in lending rate 
Argentina - - - - - - - 
Bolivia - - - - - - - 
Brazil 38.85 249.94 23.39 33.87 168.95 35.84 0.00 
Columbia 7.09 16.39 3.80 0.02 10.31 0.00 0.00 
Ecuador - - - - - - - 
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Table C6 
Test of asymmetry in regimes for high inflation countries (switches in the intercept) 
 
 Argentina Bolivia Brazil Columbia Ecuador 
Ho: p11=1-p21 
Change in inflation 0.00 0.00 40.95 0.12 - 
Change in money 0.00 0.00 50.28 5.14 - 
Change in lending rate -  33.87 0.02 - 
Expected duration (quarters) of state 1: (1-p11)
-1 
Change in inflation 1.01 100 1.22 1.59 - 
Change in money 1.01 100 1.23 1.02 - 
Change in lending rate -  1.27 1.05 - 
Expected duration (quarters) of state 2: (1-p22)
-1 
Change in inflation 100 1.01 1.05 1.03 - 
Change in money 100 1.01 1.04 1.39 - 
Change in lending rate -  1.04 6.67 - 
 
Table C7 
Estimates fit to individual high inflation country data 
)(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
e
ee
p
pp
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and p stands for 
the inflation 
Parameter Argentina Bolivia Brazil Columbia Ecuador 
a1 27.49
** 
(4.48) 
16.64** 
(7.18) 
132.45** 
(12.59) 
3.41** 
(0.81) 
- 
a2 1548.57
** 
(36.35) 
1397.16** 
(53.74) 
24.23** 
(6.16) 
3.53** 
(0.34) 
- 
b 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
0.04 
(0.59) 
- 
P11 0.99
** 
(0.01) 
0.99** 
(0.01) 
0.82** 
(0.11) 
0.63 
(1.74) 
- 
P22 0.01
** 
(0.001) 
0.11** 
(0.02) 
0.95** 
(0.03) 
0.97* 
(0.59) 
- 
s2 42.27** 
(2.67) 
66.50** 
(3.46) 
34.45** 
(3.07) 
3.81** 
(0.66) 
- 
Period 73:2-97:4 73:2-97:4 81:2-97:4 73:2-99:4 - 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
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Table C8 
Estimates fit to individual high inflation country data 
)(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
M
MM
e
ee
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and M stands for 
the money supply 
Parameter Argentina Bolivia Brazil Columbia Ecuador 
a1 25.55
** 
(3.61) 
15.93** 
(7.02) 
131.93** 
(9.22) 
5.77** 
(0.64) 
- 
a2 1546.23
** 
(41.05) 
1370.24** 
(68.72) 
17.67** 
(3.71) 
13.26** 
(1.06) 
- 
b 0.01** 
(0.004) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.13** 
(0.03) 
- 
P11 0.99
** 
(0.01) 
0.99** 
(0.01) 
0.81** 
(0.10) 
0.98** 
(0.02) 
- 
P22 0.01
** 
(0.004) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
0.96** 
(0.02) 
0.72** 
(0.31) 
- 
s2 41.52** 
(3.06) 
66.18** 
(4.39) 
29.44** 
(2.34) 
1.60** 
(0.17) 
- 
Period 73:2-97:4 73:2-97:4 73:2-97:4 73:2-97:4 - 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
 
Table C9 
Estimates fit to individual high inflation country data 
)(
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
- -+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
LR
LRLR
e
ee
ba , j = 1 or 2 
e represents the exchange rate of the country considered vis-à-vis the dollar and LR stands 
for the lending rate 
Parameter Argentina Bolivia Brazil Columbia Ecuador 
a1 - - 136.65
** 
(9.25) 
4.89** 
(0.58) 
- 
a2 - - 19.47
** 
(3.95) 
-5.85** 
(0.00) 
- 
b 
- 
- 0.002 
(0.004) 
0.03 
(0.58) 
- 
P11 - 
- 0.79** 
(0.12) 
0.95** 
(0.58) 
- 
P22 - 
- 0.96** 
(0.03) 
0.85** 
(0.39) 
- 
s2 
- 
- 29.69** 
(2.69) 
2.80** 
(0.58) 
- 
Period - - 73:2-97:4 86:1-97:4 - 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
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MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Table C10 
Wald test results for low inflation countries 
)()()(
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- -+
-
+
-
+=
-
t
tt
t
tt
t
tt
j
t
tt
GBY
GBYGBY
M
MM
e
ee
dg
p
pp
ba , j = 1 or 2 
 
 Switches in the intercept and slope Switches 
in the 
intercept 
Switches in the slope 
 H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0: 
g1 = g2 
H0: 
d1 = d2 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0: 
g1 = g2 
H0: 
d1 = d2 
Germany -1.11 -0.25 0.42 4.13 1.76 39.24 42.67 7.62 
France 9.92 6.49 9.22 9.92 34.19 3.90 13.82 10.43 
Italy 4.19 19.74 11.01 4.19 21.69 1.31 12.96 8.93 
UK 35.03 1.43 1.99 0.03 31.66 4.82 6.22 5.13 
Japan -1.45 -0.03 0.00 0.00 13.50 5.20 2.83 5.15 
 
Table C11 
Test of asymmetry in regimes (switches in the slope) 
 
Germany France Italy UK Japan 
Ho: p11=1-p21 
0.80 4.35 116.57 1.81 0.66 
Expected duration (quarters) of state 1: (1-p11)
-1 
4.17 4.35 14.29 4.35 3.33 
Expected duration (quarters) of state 2: (1-p22)
-1 
1.61 1.18 33.33 6.67 1.10 
 
 
Table C12 
Estimates fit to individual low inflation country data, t= 73:II to 98:11 
)()()(
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- -+
-
+
-
+=
-
t
tt
j
t
tt
j
t
tt
j
t
tt
GBY
GBYGBY
M
MM
e
ee
dg
p
pp
ba , j = 1 or 2 
 
Parameter Germany France Italy UK Japan 
a1 0.06 
(0.60) 
0.84 
(0.97) 
-1.47 
(1.21) 
0.25 
(0.67) 
-1.63** 
(0.70) 
b1 0.98
** 
(0.22) 
0.80 
(1.29) 
0.84 
(0.68) 
0.51* 
(0.29) 
-0.71** 
(0.35) 
b2 -1.69 
(1.29) 
-1.47** 
(0.72) 
0.10 
(0.23) 
-0.17** 
(0.001) 
0.32 
(0.28) 
g1 0.17
* 
(0.09) 
0.35** 
(0.12) 
-0.68** 
(0.26) 
-0.36 
(0.23) 
0.39** 
(0.12) 
g2 0.19 
(0.16) 
-0.68 
(1.24) 
0.43 
(0.33) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.04 
(0.16) 
d1 -0.18
** 
(0.09) 
-0.15 
(0.27) 
0.33** 
(0.15) 
-0.13** 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
d2 0.31
** 0.32** -0.31** 0.03 -0.49** 
 33
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.30) (0.19) 
P11 0.76
** 
(0.08) 
0.77** 
(0.10) 
0.93** 
(0.07) 
0.67** 
(0.25) 
0.70** 
(0.15) 
P22 0.16
** 
(0.04) 
0.15 
(0.28) 
0.97** 
(0.03) 
0.85** 
(0.32) 
0.54** 
(0.22) 
s2 3.57** 
(0.33) 
4.63** 
(0.40) 
5.13** 
(0.47) 
5.16** 
(0.54) 
5.01** 
(0.51) 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
 
Table C13  
Wald test results for high inflation countries 
)()()(
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t
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t
tt
t
tt
j
t
tt
GBY
GBYGBY
M
MM
e
ee
dg
p
pp
ba , j = 1 or 2 
 
 Switches in the intercept and slope Switches 
in the 
intercept 
Switches in the slope 
 H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0: 
g1 = g2 
H0: 
d1 = d2 
H0: 
a1 = a2 
H0: 
b1= b2 
H0: 
g1 = g2 
H0: 
d1 = d2 
Bolivia 1.77 8.02 12.61 1.77 12.45 0.00 1.22 0.64 
Brazil 407.80 38.71 15.97 407.80 564.55 2.43 079 1.41 
Columbia         
 
Table C14 
Test of asymmetry in regimes (switches in the intercept) 
 
Bolivia Brazil Columbia 
Ho: p11=1-p21 
169.05 0.001  
Expected duration (months) of state 1: (1-p11)-1 
10 1.03  
Expected duration (months) of state 2: (1-p22)-1 
25 33.33  
 
Table C15 
Estimates fit to individual high inflation country data 
)()()(
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- -+
-
+
-
+=
-
t
tt
t
tt
t
tt
j
t
tt
LR
LRLR
M
MM
e
ee
dg
p
pp
ba , j = 1 or 2 
 
Parameter Bolivia Brazil Columbia 
a1 2.00
** 
(0.26) 
16.56** 
(4.02)  
a2 0.54 
(0.40) 
-180.78** 
(9.08)  
b1 0.08
** 
(0.03) 
0.14** 
(0.01)  
g1 0.02
** 
(0.01) 
-0.09** 
(0.01)  
d1 -0.004 
(0.02) 
0.26** 
(0.01)  
 34
P11 0.90
** 
(0.04) 
0.97** 
(0.04)  
P22 0.96
** 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.67)  
s2 1.43** 
(0.09) 
20.05** 
(1.27)  
Period 87:2-00:4 81:2-97:4  
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level  
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Appendix D: The transition probabilities for the estimated equations 
using monthly data 
 
Figure D1  
The smoothed probability that the economy is in state 1, table 2 
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Figure D2  
The smoothed  probability that the economy is in state 1, table 6 
 
ARGENTINA INFLATION (INTERCEPT)
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
19
76
-1
1
19
77
-9
19
78
-7
19
79
-5
19
80
-3
19
81
-1
19
81
-1
1
19
82
-9
19
83
-7
19
84
-5
19
85
-3
19
86
-1
19
86
-1
1
19
87
-9
19
88
-7
19
89
-5
19
90
-3
19
91
-1
 
 
BRAZIL INFLATION (INTERCEPT)
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
19
80
-1
2
19
82
-2
19
83
-4
19
84
-6
19
85
-8
19
86
-1
0
19
87
-1
2
19
89
-2
19
90
-4
19
91
-6
19
92
-8
19
93
-1
0
19
94
-1
2
19
96
-2
19
97
-4
19
98
-6
19
99
-8
20
00
-1
0
 
 37
 
BOLIVIA INFLATION (INTERCEPT)
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
19
82
-7
19
83
-6
19
84
-5
19
85
-4
19
86
-3
19
87
-2
19
88
-1
19
88
-1
2
19
89
-1
1
19
90
-1
0
19
91
-9
19
92
-8
19
93
-7
19
94
-6
19
95
-5
19
96
-4
19
97
-3
19
98
-2
 
 
COLOMBIA INFLATION (INTERCEPT)
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
19
73
-1
19
74
-7
19
76
-1
19
77
-7
19
79
-1
19
80
-7
19
82
-1
19
83
-7
19
85
-1
19
86
-7
19
88
-1
19
89
-7
19
91
-1
19
92
-7
19
94
-1
19
95
-7
19
97
-1
19
98
-7
 
 
ECUADOR INFLATION (INTERCEPT)
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
19
82
-5
19
83
-6
19
84
-7
19
85
-8
19
86
-9
19
87
-1
0
19
88
-1
1
19
89
-1
2
19
91
-1
19
92
-2
19
93
-3
19
94
-4
19
95
-5
19
96
-6
19
97
-7
19
98
-8
19
99
-9
 
Figure D3 
The smoothed  probability that the economy is in state 1, table 14 
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Figure D4  
The smoothed  probability that the economy is in state 1, table 15 
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